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THE ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAM:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAM: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: An analysis and historical examination of the Army Organizational Effectiveness Program from 1966 to 1985, by Major Michael R. West, USARNG, 72 pages.

This study is an historical analysis of the Army Organizational Effectiveness Program and examines the foundations and conditions that created the program within the Army. This thesis focuses on those who proposed, initiated and guided its evolution and how major advancements in management and applied behavioral sciences provided the necessary conditions for the program to develop.

This thesis examines five distinct and interrelated phases in the development of the program:

1. The Army's awareness of the need to improve its management and leadership practices in the late 1960s.
2. Studies, restudies, and active experimentation conducted to examine the applicability of Organizational Development (OD) within the Army.
3. Initial implementation of the program.
4. The creation of the structure necessary to support the program.
5. The military and political circumstance which brought about the end of the program in 1985.

Conclusions that may be drawn from this study are: the concept of Organizational Effectiveness (OE) was controversial from the very beginning. OE was supported and developed by a small number of individuals internal to the Army and never achieved total acceptance, even though the use of behavioral sciences was successful in producing the desired outcomes for Army senior leadership. Absence of total support, a misunderstanding of OE processes, and the lack of any clear direction by senior leadership to produce quantifiable results, contributed to the end of the of the Organizational Effectiveness Program.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper could not have been written without the help of a great many people. It was my good fortune to have many friends and associates who were willing to provide their personal records and insights into the Army Organizational Effectiveness Program which facilitated my research.

A special thanks goes to LTC Robert B. James, Mr. George Fithen, LTC (Ret) Kenneth R. Burns, Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., and COL James L. Morrison who prodded, encouraged and assisted in the formal writing of this paper. They went well beyond the call of duty in making this paper a reality.

In particular, I want to thank the following individuals for their help and assistance: General (Ret) Bernard W. Rogers, MG (Ret) Phillip B. Davidson, BG (Ret) John H. Johns, Col (Ret) Ramon A. Nadal, LTC (Ret) Fred W. Schaum, LTC (Ret) Robert L. Gragg, LTC (Ret) Clifford "Dick" Deaner and Lynne Herrick. All were instrumental in helping me frame my initial approach to the subject and provided useful comments and information on the paper in its final stages of development.

Finally, a much deserved acknowledgment goes to my parents who willingly supported me through this project and shared with me the frustrations of this effort. To my father Chester V. West who passed away the day before graduation, I dedicate this thesis.



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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Army Organizational Effectiveness School and Center (OECS) was established in 1975 at Fort Ord, California and was operational until 1985. The purpose of the school was to train selected U.S. Army officers, through Organizational Development (OD) techniques, in the systems, behavioral, and management sciences. This was an effort by the Army to establish a formal school for the Army Organizational Effectiveness Program.

The school, using systems, behavioral, and management sciences, trained individuals to assist Army organizations in setting goals, develop strategic plans, improve communications, resolve problems, promote job satisfaction, and improve morale to enhance mission readiness.

BACKGROUND

Organizational Effectiveness (OE) can be traced to developments in Organizational Development (OD) from the 1950s to the 1970s and is commonly associated with improved management practices and increased organizational performance.

The early 1950s were a transitional period for civilian corporations in that up until then, emphasis was placed on the "scientific" applications to improving corporate profits, sometimes inadvertently at the expense of employees producing the product. As competition increased, management began to look at various ways to improve productivity by improving the quality of life of employees. Quality of life issues stressed the importance of employee relations through education, personal growth, motivation, communications, management, leadership, and employee psychological needs.¹

Chapter 2, the Review of Literature, reviews detailed background material concerning the history of OD and how the Army Organizational Effectiveness Program began.

Statement of the Problem

The history of the Army OE program was never officially recorded for publication. The purpose of this thesis is to detail the beginning of the OE program in the Army and provide an overview of why OECS came about and ended. Detailed research regarding the internal workings of OECS is an area which deserves further research. This thesis brings together personal and public documents to give an overview of the history of OE within the Army.

Specific Issues Internal to the Problem Statement

At least two subordinate tasks must be addressed in this study to lend support to the problem statement. They are:

a. Determine why there was both resistance to and support for the Army OE Program within Department of the Army.

b. Determine why the program lasted only ten years and what key factors contributed to its closure.

Assumptions

The assumptions made in this thesis are:

a. The skills and knowledge acquired through the Army OECS were valuable and contributed significantly to the readiness of the Army.

b. There is a need and desire within the US Army to maintain, retain and improve the productivity of its personnel.

c. OE techniques and technology are presently in use throughout the US Army.

Significance of the Study

The Army OE Program was historically important because it was an attempt at applying behavioral science

techniques and technology in a systemic manner throughout the Army.

From 1966 until the present, only fragmented information has been available to those interested in the historical aspects of the Army OE Program. Those records which do exist are those which were copied and retained by those people significantly involved in the beginning of the program. The documents obtained were through friends and associates who had specific knowledge or records of the history of the Army OE program.

Documents and correspondence initiating the close of the school in 1985 are only available in part and difficult, if not impossible, to find. Such documentation is in the form of memorandums for record, white papers, meeting agenda notes, and memorandums for correspondence purposes.

The Records Management Office, Correspondence and Record Center, Secretary of the Army, Room 3D 679, JD MSSF-CRSC, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., maintains copies of records surrounding the closure of the OE school. These records were requested in January, 1990. However, because they have yet to be listed and catalogued they are not currently available for research purposes.

The purpose of this study is to tie together published, and unpublished material to give the reader a

comprehensive history of OD in the Army.

Definition of Terms

The definitions of terms used in this thesis are:

a. "Behavioral science" refers to the broad categories of sociology and psychology. These concepts are used to diagnose an organization's problems, to equip organization members with a conceptual language to talk about problems they are facing; to redesign unsatisfactory structures and procedures, and to provide a basis for evaluation of organizational development interventions and processes.²

b. "Management science" is defined as the study of the behavioral sciences, by managers, to get things done through other people. It is through the behavioral sciences that managers modify their subordinate's behavior to influence them to accomplish tasks assigned³.

c. "Organizational Development" (OD) is the use of behavioral and management sciences to improve motivation and promote a better integration of people with their jobs. It is a process which attempts to increase organizational effectiveness by integrating individual desire for growth and development with organizational goals. This process is a planned change effort which involves a total system over a

period of time, and these change efforts are related to the organization's mission. OD is a continuing effort to develop better procedures and a supporting climate for dealing with organizational problems.⁴

d. "Organizational effectiveness" results from the use of the behavioral sciences. The result is increased worker satisfaction with the work environment, improved quality of work output, morale, and esprit de corps. OD focuses on optimizing goals from a systems perspective and emphasizing human behavior in organizational settings.⁵ In 1977, the Army officially defined Organizational Effectiveness as:

The systematic military application of selected management and behavioral science skills and methods to improve how the total organization functions to accomplish assigned missions and increase combat readiness. It is applicable to organizational processes (including training in interpersonal skills) and when applied by a commander within an organization, is tailored to the unique needs of the organization and normally implemented with the assistance of an Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer (OESO). (Army Regulation 600-76)⁶

e. "Soft skills" are used by OD specialists in OD workshops. These skills take the form of assisting a group of workers to resolve problems, enhance communication, and increase productivity. OD specialists must apply them

in a non-threatening and non-judgemental manner toward the client and group members to bring about the desired change. The goal is increased sound leadership practices and productivity at all levels in the organization.

f. "Hard skills" deal with quantifiable methods to produce evidence which may indicate problems within the organization. It is based on the use of mathematical models. An example would be the use of surveys which ask specific questions about the organizational climate. The results are tabulated to give an idea of what is actually going on within the organization.

g. "Systems" are collections of parts which interact with each other to function as a whole. Systems are composed of three basic parts. Inputs, throughputs, and outputs.

"Inputs" represent all the factors which are invested in an organization by the external environment. This may include money, new employees, machinery, and raw materials.

"Throughputs" are the the processes acted upon to produce an output. For example, the Army may want to develop a new tank. By applying input resources, skilled personnel would take these input resources and design and manufacture the weapon system. This process eventually

would yield a tank, which is the output.

"Output" is returned to the environment in the form of a product and yields profits, losses, or some form of return on investment for the organization.

h. An "OD workshop" is a small group of people affiliated with an organization gathered together to resolve issues. An OD specialist internal or external to the organization may facilitate the meeting.

i. "Organizational assessment" is a technique to gather information about an organization quickly. It may take the form of surveys and individual and group interviews. Specific questions are asked and the results processed and given as feedback to the client by an OD specialist.

Limitations

Much of the research material presented in this study is based on interviews and unpublished records provided by persons involved in the early development of the Army OE Program. These documents are internal Department of The Army memorandums for record, point papers, United States Army study projects, briefing slides, and personal correspondence dating from 1966 to 1977. Some chronological gaps may exist due to records not being properly stored or

accounted for. For example, when the OECS at Fort Ord, California was closed, only a portion of the records were shipped to the National Archives in Washington, D.C. The others are the personal property of individuals who were involved in helping establish OECS.

Delimitations

This study will focus on the history of the Army OE Program exclusively. It will not address the influence or effect it may have had on the US Army.

Methods and Procedures

Very little information was available during the initial research for this thesis. To overcome this problem the following procedures were used.

First, I gathered a list of phone numbers from personal acquaintances and professional associates. These people referred me to other individuals who provided more information. There were two categories. In the first category were those individuals who had direct involvement in the program from the beginning. They provided the core of information for this study. The second category consisted of individuals who worked on the periphery of the early program and who had in their possession historical

records or knowledge of other key individuals who might be able to provide additional information on the program.

In addition I contacted librarians at Fort Ord, California and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas who assisted in providing research materials and publications.

This method, although slow and laborious, resulted in obtaining not only telephone interviews but previously unpublished material from private resources. In addition, there were many individuals who were willing to answer a set of structured questions and return the answers to me on cassette tape. I used no surveys or experimental techniques in this research project.

ENDNOTES

1. Mel Spehn, Reflections on The Organizational Effectiveness Center and School. (Monterey, California: Fall, 1985) p. 1.
2. Mathew B. Miles, and Richard A. Schmuck, Organizational Development: theory, practice and research. (1978) p. 23
3. Dennis W. Organ, and W. Clay Hammer, Organizational Behavior: An Applied Psychological Approach. (1982) p. 56
4. *ibid.*, p. 41
5. *ibid.*, p. 4
6. 5. Melvin R. Hewitt, Historical Evolution of Organizational Development and Organizational Effectiveness within the Army, 1969-1980. (Monterey, California: July 1980) p. 101.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The Army's investigation into the behavioral sciences grew from its need to produce effective solutions to problems such as racial discrimination, drug and alcohol abuse, and the lack of a positive image, all of which detracted from the Army's mission capability. It was a search to do business in a more efficient way by providing solutions to these types of problems.

Senior Army leaders understood that the Army needed to change and began to explore the possible use of organizational development techniques to make positive changes that would increase Army mission readiness. A brief history of OD will give the reader some insights into how OD originated, its effects on civilian corporate organizations and the eventual transfer of this technology to the Army.

HISTORY OF OD

Four decades ago, organizational development emerged from three basic sources. The laboratory training movement; the development of survey research and feedback; and the efforts of Kurt Lewin to develop methods to enhance organizational effectiveness.

Laboratory training or Training-Groups are

unstructured, small-group situations in which participants learn from their interactions with the group. The concept was developed about 1946 from various experiments in the use of discussion groups to achieve changes in behavior in civilian organizations. A workshop held at the State Teachers College at New Britain, Connecticut, in the summer of 1946 marked the emergence of laboratory training. The leadership team for this action research was Kurt Lewin, Kenneth Benne, Leland Bradford, and Ronald Lippitt.

From this project emerged a three-week session in 1947 at Bethel, Maine, initially financed by the Office of Naval Research and sponsored by the National Education Association and the Research Center for Group Dynamics. The work of that summer was to evolve into the National Training Laboratories for Group Development and T-Group training.²

As trainers in the laboratory training and group dynamics movement began to work with social systems of more complexity than T-Groups, they began to experience frustration in the transfer of laboratory skills and insights of individuals into the solutions of problems in organizations. Personal skills learned in T-Group settings were very difficult to transfer to complex organizations.²

Complex organizations are defined as organizations which are stable in the face of a wide variety of

environmental changes, are purposeful and actively pursue goals, follow an outlined program to attain stated goals, modify programs to avoid repeating the same mistakes, anticipate changes in their environment, attempt to modify the environment to reach stated outcomes, are flexible, and reorganize their parts or subsystems to meet new conditions or achieve new goals.³

The late Douglas McGregor, working with Union Carbide beginning in 1957 is considered one of the first behavioral scientists to solve this transfer problem systematically and help implement the application of laboratory training skills to complex organizations.⁴ McGregor established a small consulting group within Union Carbide and used behavioral science knowledge to assist line managers in improving productivity. The training program emphasized intergroup as well as interpersonal relations. There were additional studies conducted at Standard Oil Company, and the combination of the two confirmed the need for active involvement by leadership and the need to apply the behavioral sciences on the job to effect organizational change.⁵

Survey research is a form of action research which employs the use of attitude surveys and data feedback in workshop sessions. Data from questionnaires distributed

within the organization are collected and tabulated. Concerns and issues are ranked by numerical reoccurrence. This data is then given as feedback to management and employees. Through a series of workshops, a collaborative decision is made on how to resolve problems identified.

In an experiment conducted with the Detroit Edison Company in 1948, using the survey research and feedback method, the following conclusions were made by McGregor:

The results of this experimental study lend support to the idea that an intensive, group discussion procedure for utilizing the results of an employee questionnaire survey can be an effective tool for introducing positive change in a business organization...it deals with the system of human relationships as a whole (superior and subordinate can change together) and it deals with each manager, supervisor, and employee in the context of his own job, his own problems, and his own work relationships.⁶

Kurt Lewin must be given credit for helping the development of the social sciences. His work and interest in the behavioral sciences assisted in the beginning if the National Training Laboratories (NTL) and the Research Center for Group Dynamics.⁷

WHAT IS ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Organizational development is an effort planned organization-wide and managed from the top to increase

organizational effectiveness and health through planned interventions in the organization's "processes" using behavioral science knowledge.⁹

An OD program involves a systematic diagnosis of the organization, the development of a strategic plan for improvement, and the mobilization of resources to carry out the effort.⁹

It involves the total organization and subsystems. and may address the culture, reward systems, and total management strategy.¹⁰

The management of the system has a personal investment in the OD effort and its outcomes. Management is committed to the goals of the OD effort and supports the methods used to achieve the goals.¹¹

The OD effort is designed to increase organizational effectiveness and health. An effective organization can be defined as one which:

- a. Sets plans and goals and manages work to achieve these goals.
- b. Lets the problem determines how resources are organized.
- c. Makes decisions at the closest source of information, regardless of where these sources are located on the organizational chart.
- d. Uses a fair reward system. If you perform well you are rewarded. If you fail to perform, an attempt is made to determine why and what can be done to resolve the problem.

- e. Communication has undistorted lateral and vertical communication. People are open and confronting and share all relevant facts and information.
- f. Insures conflict is quickly resolved.
- g. Insures brain storming and clashes over ideas are devoid of interpersonal conflict.
- h. Views itself as a system focusing on achieving goals.
- i. Has a shared value, and management strategy to support it, of trying to help each other and maintain organizational integrity and uniqueness.
- j. Depends on feedback from all members to improve the quality of output and sustain positive interpersonal relationships.¹²

In summary, OD is a planned and sustained effort to apply behavioral science for system improvement, which creates conditions favorable to accomplish specific missions for an organization.

ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE U.S. ARMY

This review of literature identifies the sources used in addressing the thesis questions and provides an overview of the literature to give the reader a basis for further research.

The materials acquired are primarily fugitive documents from private sources, are unclassified, and represent a cross section of information collected from key individuals responsible for establishing the Army

Organizational Effectiveness Program at Fort Ord, California in 1975.

Historical documentation of the OE effort in the Army from 1975 to 1985, has been produced only in part, and I believe this is the first effort to bring together its chronological history. Reference materials consist of books, government publications, unpublished government documents, and transcribed tapes. These materials are blended together to give the reader a comprehensive history of OD within the Army.

The use of OD by the Army to improve organizational effectiveness can be attributed to Col (Ret) Ramon A. Nadal, BG (Ret) John H. Johns, Col (Ret) Fred W. Schaum, Gen (Ret) Bernard W. Rogers, and LTG (Ret) Phillip B. Davidson. All had a profound influence on the beginning of the Army's use of OD and the beginning of the Army Organizational Effectiveness Program at Fort Ord. They provided the majority of the materials for this paper from their own personal records.

The Combined Arm Research Library (CARL), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, had no information regarding the history of the Army Organizational Effectiveness Program. It was necessary to contact the post library at Fort Ord, California to begin my research. I selected this start

point because the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS) had been located at Fort Ord. The post library was a likely repository for documents that pertained to OECS history after it closed in October 1985.

The research material gathered spans the period from 1966 to 1985. Written communications between 1980 and 1985 are surprisingly absent. It was necessary to fill the gaps with taped interviews from those key players instrumental in establishing the Army OE program.

The Review of Literature is divided into four parts. Part 1 lists the books; part 2, the government publications; part 3 is a detailed description of unpublished government documents; and part 4 consists of transcribed tapes from key players who influenced or played a direct role in the development of OD within the Army.

PART 1

BOOKS

Building a Volunteer Army: The Fort Ord Contribution, Department of the Army, 1975 is an excellent source of information on the application of organizational development techniques in basic and advanced individual training at Fort Ord, California, starting in 1969.

Major General Phillip B. Davidson, Commander of Fort Ord, created the Training Management Evaluation

Committee (TMEC) to improve Fort Ord's training system, correct weaknesses in training, enhance performance, reduce costs, and improve the quality of life for the individual soldier and instructors.

MG Davidson's program was unique in that it embodied the application of OD techniques and practices and measured quantitatively as well as qualitatively the morale, performance, attitudes, and satisfaction of the trainees, cadre, and leadership .

Fort Ord ventured into OD in 1969 on a parallel course with Department of the Army, and it was not until 1973 that the two converged. Davidson's taped interview in this review explains his rationale. The results of this convergence reaffirmed to Army senior leadership the need for OD activities and the use of the behavioral sciences to improve organizational effectiveness.

PART 2

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Organizational Effectiveness Within The U.S. Army: Final Report, April 1977 provides an assessment of the Army OE activities after the first year of operation. It includes training, a strategic view of the future, courses of action for institutionalizing OE within the Army, and sustainment of its capabilities.

This document discusses four primary OECS issues in its first year of operation: successes, failures, lessons learned, and a framework for possible future organizational changes.

PART 3

UNPUBLISHED GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

The following unpublished written government documents were provided to me by BG (Ret) John H. Johns, LTC (Ret) Ramon A. Nadal, Col. (Ret) Fred Schaum, LTC (Ret) Robert L Gragg, and Lynne Herrick, post librarian at Fort Ord, California.

The documents received from these individuals may overlap; however, they highlight the importance of a cross-sectional view of the development of the Army Organizational Effectiveness Program. The documents represent a record of key events, which eventually established the Army Organizational Effectiveness Program within the U.S. Army. Because of the volume of resource material, it was necessary to document and list only those items which specifically addressed or were indicative of changes that had a high degree of influence on the establishment of the Army Organizational Effectiveness Program.

Colonel Nadal-Army OE, 1979 is a is an interview

conducted by Nadal and OECS to record his involvement in the use of OD in the army. It provides a comprehensive overview of the events, learning experiences, key players, as well as a look at the resistance and opposition encountered regarding the use of the behavioral sciences in the U.S. Army. It is a personal accounting and dates may be approximate.¹³

Suggestions for General Westmoreland, 1971, from Ramon A. Nadal. This letter caught the attention of General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff Army while Major Nadal was attending the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. General Westmoreland had addressed the student body and afterward Major Nadal approached him with the idea that the Army should be looking into the behavioral sciences to resolve problems affecting the Army. Westmoreland was intrigued by the idea and shortly requested Nadal to provide an explanation of the behavioral sciences and how they might improve the Army.

Memorandum For Record, Subject: VCSA SEE ME regarding suggestions for General William Westmoreland from LTC Ramon A. Nadal, 24 November 1971. The importance of this document cannot be over-emphasized. It was the first large scale meeting convened by General Westmoreland to discuss the application of the behavioral sciences and how

they might be integrated into the U.S. Army to cope with racial problems, drug abuse, leadership and communications.

There were fourteen generals at the meeting, facilitated by General Bruce Palmer, VCA, including ten military staff officers and one civilian. The meeting was aimed at determining the possible applications of the behavioral sciences within the U.S. Army. Discussions revolved around a lack of understanding of the behavioral sciences, a need to return to the basics of leadership, the lack of spaces for behavioral scientists, and the absence of behavioral scientists and proponents for the development and the application of organizational development within the Army.

At the conclusion of the meeting, General Bruce Palmer directed the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army (SAMVA), LTC Nadal, to establish a temporary group to develop a proposal for a permanent group in the Office of the Chief of Staff Army. This group would advise the Chief of Staff Army on behavioral science matters and direct the Army's use of behavioral science, develop study proposals for behavioral science research, and implement a plan to identify positions in the Army which required personnel with a behavioral science background.

Between 24 November 1971 and 8 June 1972, under

LTC Nadal's direction, the study group visited and discussed the use of the behavioral sciences with civilian corporations such as AT&T, General Motors, Dupont, Sears, and with the Harvard Business School. On 8 June 1972, LTC Nadal gave a decision briefing on the use of the behavioral sciences in the Army. The briefing concluded that there was a need to explore the use of the behavioral sciences in civilian organizations and determine if they could be applied to the Army. Memorandum For Record, Subject OSAMVA, Decision Briefing on Behavioral Science 1972, resulted in a decision to develop a series of pilot programs, which will be discussed later in the review of literature.

The most important aspect of the meeting was that the majority agreed that the use of organizational development was a valid pursuit in assisting the U.S. Army.

The CSA Army made several key decisions. First, he approved the use of the behavioral sciences in the U.S. Army. Second, positions were to be identified that require a behavioral science degree within the Army. Third, an education program was to be developed for the Army to increase the awareness and value of the behavioral sciences. Fourth, a series of five pilot projects were to be established for the application, study and use of the behavioral sciences. The Motivational Development Advisory

Group established all five pilot projects.

It is important to note that after the meeting on 8 June 1972, LTC Nadal was reassigned from United States Army Europe (USAREUR) to the Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel (DCSPER) office. From this point forward, General Bernard Rogers, Col. John H. Johns, and LTC. Fred Schaum continued to advocate, support, and emphasize the application of OD techniques within the Army.

The Motivational Development Program Advisory Group was officially established in a Memorandum from Chief of Staff Army, Subject: Motivational Development Program Advisory Groups, May 1973. Its purpose was to assign responsibilities to Army staff agencies and appropriate representatives for the advisory groups. The Motivational Development Program would conduct a series of pilot projects to test various techniques for improving attitudes, morale and productivity within the U.S. Army.

The five pilot projects established under this memorandum are as follows:

1. Survey Feedback (U.S. Army Europe). This project consisted of the administration of a standardized attitude survey to provide the unit commanders (USAREUR) with an objective analysis of a unit's leadership climate. Information from the surveys, given in a feedback session to

the commander, assisted in determining ways to improve leadership, motivation, and discipline within the units.

2. Organizational Management Skill Development (Fort Bliss, Texas). Three workshops provided sixty hours of training in the application of goal setting, group problem solving, and performance counseling skills. The workshops were based on the idea of Management By Objectives (MBO). MBO describes techniques and processes to encourage top-to-bottom participation within the chain of command and assists in identifying problems that can be resolved immediately.

3. Assessment Center (Fort Benning, Georgia). This project was designed to identify an individual's leadership strengths and weaknesses and to indicate the potential of a pre-commissioned service member.

4. Installation Level Organizational Development (Fort Ord, California). This pilot project had the mission of determining ways to increase organizational effectiveness by improving the relationship of people to their jobs and work environment. Specific objectives were the definition of resources required to conduct OD activities at other Army installations, the definition of OD techniques and procedures, and the measurement of the effects of OD on the functions of the U.S. Army. This program would also decide

on instructor qualifications and develop instructional materials for possible future use.

The focus at Fort Ord was team building and group problem solving. The intent of this project was to build trust and confidence among individuals and groups throughout the organization. The focus and intent were to create an open climate to discuss and resolve problems, and to enhance insights into individual behavior that affect an organization.

The Leadership and Management Development Course (L&MDC) was a result of this pilot project. It was designed to emphasize individual communication, problem solving, decision-making skills, self awareness, and a broader understanding of human motivation and behavior. It served as the core of organizational effectiveness training.

5. Organizational Development (Department of the Army). This project was a combination of the other four pilot program techniques in a major headquarters environment at the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN).

The goal of the MDP program was to establish the five pilot projects and, concurrently, to train staff personnel to sustain the programs once started. The key to the short term success was adhering to the concept of progressive decentralization as each project moved from

research and development to implementation.

Memorandum For Record, Subject: Executive Summary,
1st DA Motivational Development Workshop, 14 March 1974,
describes a workshop conducted at Fort Benjamin Harrison,
Indiana on February 26-28, 1974. This document provides some
insight into the status of the Motivational Development
Program and how the Army would proceed to review, evaluate,
and begin to solidify the concept and application of
organizational effectiveness.

When General Bernard W. Rogers became Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel (DCPER), he expressed a strong
concern for the lack of recognition and integration of Human
Resource Development as an integral part of the Army
Personnel Management System. Although Human Resource
Development would eventually become a part of the Army
Personnel Management System, General Rogers in a Letter to
William E. Depuy, (25 October 1974), expressed his concerns
over the lack of training, education, and professional
development of personnel management officers in the
Personnel Management Specialty. General Rogers also
stressed the need to retain the Fort Ord OD Directorate as a
training facility to teach Human Resource Management and OD
specialists. At this point, it was apparent that General
Rogers had identified Fort Ord as the key training facility

for OD within the Army.

On 6 February 1975 at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, a decision was made at a meeting with Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel, General Rogers (DCSPER), Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) and United States Army Administration Center (USAADMIN) to establish an Army school during FY 76 to train personnel in the use the behavioral sciences.

The Training and Doctrine and Command (TRADOC) was advised in a Letter, Subject: Human Resource Management (HRM). Tasking Statement, 18 May 1975 to establish the OETC facility at Fort Ord, California. The mission was to train selected Army personnel in the use of the behavioral sciences and OD technology beginning no later than January 1976. TRADOC was also tasked with examining requirements for a Human Resource Management Speciality Identifier (SI) or Additional Skill Identifier (ASI), and developing a continuing program for the identification, selection, training, deployment, and use of Human Resource Management personnel. Furthermore, the document delineated the chain of command for Human Resource Management (HRM), assigned duty positions, and defined the mission, curriculum parameters, and what qualifications were desired.

Organizational Effectiveness in the U.S. Army,
circa 1975, written by Ramon A. Nadal, provides a broad
overview of the development of organizational development
and its introduction to the U.S. Army. It provides
excellent background material for further study.

TRANSCRIBED TAPES

THE ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAM

A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE

BY COL (Ret) Fred Schaum, November, 1989

This taped interview is in response to a request
by the author for specific information regarding the history
of the Army Organizational Effectiveness program. It is a
personal account of one individual who was instrumental in
implementing the concept of OE within the Army. In addition,
Col Schaum gives credit to many other key, players by name,
who believed that the behavioral sciences could in fact help
the Army in improving its leadership and management. This
interview examines his experiences, thoughts, insights, and
observations as he assisted in changing and improving the
Army through the use of the behavioral sciences.

Schaum traces the history and application of the
behavioral sciences from the Military Psychology and
Leadership Department at West Point, in 1970, to the pilot

projects developed in the basement of the Pentagon. These circumstances would eventually establish the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School at Fort Ord, California.

Schaum gave five specific reasons why the program lasted only ten years. First, the organization known as Deputy Chief of Staff Operations (DCSOPS), who initially had proponency for the OE program and never wanted it, insisted on budgetary control of the program. DCSOPS resisted the concept of OE and maintained that dollar requests for the program could be used elsewhere.

The second reason is more of a function of politics and personality rather than what was good for the Army. Specific agencies within the government that had contracts with civilian corporations using OD techniques, (which I have been asked not to disclose), resisted the establishment of a consultants' school because of the possibility of a loss of contract money. In addition, these civilian corporations were headed by retired Army personnel who had vested interest in maintaining their employment as well as ensuring corporate profits.

Third, the school at Fort Ord, California had a great degree of difficulty in finding strong commanders who were committed to the concept and employment of OE within the Army.

Fourth, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which eventually assumed proponentcy for OECS, refused to give OE a fair shake. TRADOC wanted to demolish the OE program because it did not understand fully what OE was, felt that spaces for OECS could be used in some other capacity, and most importantly, considered that the concept of OE was a "grass roots" effort generated by people outside of TRADOC and supported by the CSA, General Bernard Rogers. In other words it was not their idea. Rogers supported and helped sustain the OE concept, but his degree of influence would be diluted when he became the NATO commander because of his absence from the Pentagon.

Finally, Schaum suggests that the Army never "warmed up" to the idea of human resource development or a human resource directorate. The use of HRD seemed to indicate a failing of leadership or a lack of leadership.

To a certain degree, there was a reluctance by commanders to use OE resources. In fact, Schaum states that when it became apparent that the structure of OE might not survive, those affiliated with the program were at risk. Risk could be interpreted as relegation to non-contributing positions because of support for OE or transfers to assignments considered undesirable.

In summary, this taped document provides

considerable insight into the thoughts, ideas and people involved with implementing the OE program in the Army.

PRELUDE TO ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

By LTG (Ret) Phillip B. Davidson. December 1989

Davidson, who assumed command of Fort Ord, California in 1969, discussed candidly the training conditions he found upon his arrival. Fort Ord was a basic and advanced infantry training facility for the 7th Infantry Division. Upon his arrival he found a lack of concern for training by previous commanding generals, substandard training, and a lack of interest by non-commissioned and commissioned officers in producing combat qualified soldiers. Davidson states there was little supervision from the top down, and senior leaders under his command had no idea how to correct the deficiencies.

Davidson established the Training Management and Evaluation Committee (TMEC) with the help of outside OD consultants to change the situation

The findings of TMEC disclosed the following problems:

a. Trainers at the senior level were inadequate.

b. Basic trainees were exploited, punished, and abused physically for any minor violation of standard orders.

c. Trainees were held in contempt by the trainers and vice versa.

d. Trainees' basic needs were ignored. They were allowed no free time for post exchange privileges in that the exchanges usually closed before the training day ended.

e. Trainees were confined to the post for the first eight weeks because of a meningitis scare that occurred in the early 1960's. (It was later determined that the meningitis problem had been brought on post from the local civilian community).

f. Training inspections by higher headquarters consisted of short visits and speeches. Little or no effort was made to determine the status of current training.

Davidson, who had very little training in the behavioral sciences, set about to correct the deficiencies. He stated that this was possible only because 6th Army couldn't have cared less about what he was doing or how he did it. They were only interested in reports, facts, and figures. Davidson employed the assistance of several

friends experienced in the application of the behavioral sciences, and devised the "merit reward system" which measured training progress through attitude surveys and individual and group interviews. Living conditions and quality of life issues were measured by these surveys.

Key areas of interest, such as mess hall food, training conditions and the treatment of troops, were evaluated by TMEC. Consistently negative reports in these areas were investigated and then corrected. Results were higher morale, improved esprit de corps, and improved training performance. The use of TMEC and OD technology improved post conditions dramatically.

In his interview, Davidson emphasized two points. First, to obtain any type of positive change within the Army, the most senior leaders must apply pressure through the chain of command from top to bottom and this pressure must be harsh at times.

Second, the Army must sell the idea of change from the bottom up. The organization must be totally involved. The use and implementation of OD to affect positive changes can only be implemented through education and on the job training.¹⁴

ENDNOTES

1. Mathew B. Miles and Richard A. Schmuck, Organizational Development: theory, practice, and research. (1978) p. 23
2. ibid., p. 15
3. Draper L. Kauffmann Jr., Systems 1. An Introduction to Systems Thinking. (1980) p. 29
4. Miles and Schmuck, Organizational Development: theory, practice, and research. (1978) p. 18
5. ibid., p. 18
6. ibid., p. 20
7. ibid., p. 20
8. ibid., p. 20
9. ibid., p. 20
10. ibid., p. 21
11. ibid., p. 21
12. ibid., p. 21
13. Ramon A. Nadal, Colonel Nadal-Army OE., Interview (1973)
14. Phillip B. Davidson., Prelude to Organizational Effectiveness., Taped interview (1989)

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

My initial research for historical information on the Army OE program met with little success. What I had envisioned was a large repository of information, readily available, chronologically ordered, and historically precise. This was not the case.

After several weeks of searching for written documentation at the Command and General Staff College library and finding little information regarding the Army OE program, I decided to seek outside resources. This lack of resource material provoked my curiosity because the Army had contributed a significant amount of time and effort into the research of the behavioral sciences to improve its readiness posture.

In a 1971 briefing document titled, "The Office of the Special Assistant Modern Volunteer Army (OSAMVA) Behavioral Science Study,"¹ the Army General Staff Council, consisting of deputy directorates under General Bernard Rogers, was presented a \$1.2 million dollar action plan to investigate the following areas: job enrichment, assessment centers, management by objectives, and motivational measurement systems. In addition, OD pilot programs within

the DA staff, Continental Army Command (CONARC), and the Fort Ord Training Center in California were to be established. The council agreed, subject to approval by DA. Compared to record amounts being spent on the Vietnam war during this time, \$1.2 million dollars was a mere pittance for an organization that admittedly was searching for solutions to serious internal problems.

My focus is to produce a list of possible contributing sources and references which would answer the problem statement posed in Chapter One. The reader should keep in mind there was a lack of consistent, accurate, and reliable government recordings of the OE program. OD efforts in the Army were not consistently documented by DA. It was a small group of dedicated individuals mentioned previously that provided the information for this paper.

Since the CGSC library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas contained nothing of significance regarding the Army OE history, I contacted the post library at Fort Ord, California. Lynne Herrick, who had been the installation librarian for OECS provided a data base of names and material to assist me in the writing of this paper.

The driving personality behind the application of the behavioral sciences within the Army was Col (Ret) Ramon A. Nadal. I contacted Nadal in November, 1989, by telephone

and informed him of my thesis subject. During a series of discussions, he agreed to provide me with records in his possession and also to identify others who would be willing to exchange their ideas and experiences.

During the same period, I contacted LTC (Ret) Robert L. Gragg who had been the Regular Army supervisor for the Army OE program for seven years and the liaison officer who interfaced with National Guard Bureau in Washington, D.C. regarding OE matters. Gragg was a strong supporter and advocate of the OE program. His personal insights and understanding of the Army bureaucracy contributed significantly to this thesis.

Col (Ret) Clifford "Dick" Deaner was the chief of the West Coast region for OE from 1977 to 1985. Deaner assisted me by providing an account of his experiences and a eulogy for and critique of the OE program.

Herrick, Nadal, Gragg, and Deaner supplied the necessary information to support this thesis. From their input, I accumulated a list of thirty names, which I sorted into two distinct groups.

The first group were those who were directly involved in the OE program from the beginning and could possibly have written records in their possession.

Second were those military and civilian personnel

who worked on the periphery of the program, supported the idea of OD within the Army, and in effect were the staff that implemented the OE program.

ENDNOTES

1. Ramon A. Nadal, Briefing: The Office Special Assissant
Modern Volunteer Army (OSAMVA) Behavioral Science Study.
(Washington D.C.: 1971) p. 21

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

One of the biggest obstacles to implementing OD technology in the Army was the hostility to "behavioral science" by various individuals and organizations within the Army. This resistance is related to concepts of management, personnel management, and leadership, which are for the most part difficult to define or quantify.² These concepts applied to human behavior cannot be measured with any degree of certainty. There are two reasons for distrust of the behavioral sciences all of which stem from the unpredictability of human behavior.

First, behavioral science does advocate a bias toward individual freedom. Freedom may be equated to participatory decision making within an organization and the sharing of power. This equates to a loss of control by the Army which can be threatening.²

Another objection is that behavioral science has little to offer the decision maker in terms of verifiable data.² For example, a survey may be conducted to determine the positive and negative attitudes of soldiers toward their leader. The results could be interpreted at face value. Assuming the survey is unbiased, a trained behavioral scientist goes beyond the survey results, however he

interacts with a group of selected individuals, in a workshop setting, to surface hidden agendas, biases, attitudes and perceptions about the organization. Once he identifies the real problem, he can begin to work on the cause. Behavioral scientists assist participants in removing their biases about the organization.

In attempting to overcome resistance to OD efforts and create a climate, that enhanced and developed leadership, the Army identified one key area of concern: the lack of qualified personnel to teach behavioral science. Schaum states, "there is a need to develop in-house capability in the use of the behavioral sciences."⁴

DA and General Rogers could not come to an agreement on the use of behavioral sciences to improve Army leadership.

The key players identified in chapter 2 were those who advocated the use of OD and believed the conceptual understanding of the processes involved to increase OE was desirable.⁵ Schaum suggests that understanding the concept of good leadership does not necessarily make a good leader. Leadership ability must be in the person; this transcends intellectual knowledge.⁶

The Motivational Development Program (Chapter 2) was an important pivot point in establishing the application of OD

within the Army. The program has its roots in the Office Special Assistant for Training (OSAT), established in the Office Chief of Staff Army (OCSA), in July 1972.⁷

OSAT had two functions: improvement of training and motivational development. Together these functions focused on the "people environment or the psychological aspects of those in the military."⁸

The Motivational Development Program resulted from a study conducted by Office Special Assistant Modern Volunteer Army (OSAMVA) to determine how the Army might make better use of the behavioral sciences to improve organizational effectiveness.⁹ Information was gathered from civilian, government, academia, and management consulting firms regarding the use of the behavioral sciences.

The essence of the study was to determine the potential application of OD in the Army. The report concluded that behavioral science knowledge is not readily available to the Army's top policy makers, that there are insufficient officers trained in the behavioral sciences, that behavioral science is not understood, and that the Army was not using behavioral science knowledge to improve organizational effectiveness.¹⁰

On June 8, 1972, CSA directed the following actions based on the study:

a. Establish in OCSA an element to coordinate OD within the Army.

b. Establish an advisory board of OD specialists.

c. Identify and validate positions that require behavioral science education.

d. Establish a course for instructors who will be teaching leadership in the Army school system.

e. Conduct an orientation and education program of the value of OD in the Army.

f. Conduct a series of pilot projects to test OD concepts and techniques.¹¹

Based on this directive, the Motivational Development Program was established. The program assumed that the Army would continue to be an all-volunteer force with emphasis on marketing positive military qualities and that the Army would recruit and retain men and women to sustain the force structure. The goal of OSAT was to examine procedures and techniques to improve motivation through the use of the behavioral sciences through the leaders of the Army.¹²

Soldier recruitment and retention was another area of concern. In order to recruit and retain soldiers, the Army had become increasingly aware that it had to provide an opportunity for individual soldiers to achieve personal

goals. These goals reflect a combination of economic security, self-esteem, and a sense of accomplishment.¹³ Changing the perception of the military life-style was difficult from the beginning because of the unpopularity of the Vietnam War.

Schaum states:

Because of rapid cultural changes within our society, increased economic prosperity and mobility has to some degree lessened the attraction of commitment to any specific organization. Opportunities for improved education and monetary rewards have increased quality people to demand more meaningful work.¹⁴

OSAT, through the study conducted by OSAMVA, drew heavily upon the OD approach to management and applied a systemic way of achieving the goals of integrating the soldier, job environment and leadership that were congruent with the Army organization.¹⁵

The Army's effort to introduce OD to the organization was never intended to replace management efforts. The intent was to integrate, enhance, and complement management efforts. It was a systematic application of behavioral techniques to increase organizational effectiveness.¹⁶

The need to understand the systems approach is described best in Peter Checkland's book Systems Thinking

and Systems Practice. Chapter 6, "The Development of Soft Systems Thinking" discusses problems in social systems where goals are often obscure. In contrast, it also focuses on the "human activity system" where goals, through a group effort, are clear, consise and defined.¹⁷ Checkland further states that the "soft" skills attempt to "ascertain to what extent systems concepts could be used in a helpful and coherent way to tackle problems, which reside in social systems and are of their nature difficult to define".¹⁸ This approach applies to all types of organizations including the military.

The series of five pilot projects (Chapter 2) was an attempt to define the nature of problems affecting the Army. (Drug abuse, AWOLS, discipline problems, etc.) Checkland states that these are..."problem situations" in which there are felt to be unstructured problems...."¹⁹

For example, hard systems thinking implies a "time dependent situation in which the sequence of events was recognition of the problem, definition of the problem, action to solve the problem and problem solved."²⁰ This describes the application of quantifiable computations but is inadequate for unstructured problems for two reasons.

First, when human activities are social and interactively involved, problems may seem recognizable but cannot be defined.²¹ It is a feeling or suspicion that

something is not right.

Second, problems and perceptions in social systems always change because the passage of time modifies the perception of the problem and perceptions are subjective.²²

The Army was wrestling with numerous problems and in the beginning had a difficult time in defining what the problems were. Checkland defines the word "problem" as:

relating to real world manifestations of human activity systems is characterized by a sense of mismatch, which eludes precise definition, between what is perceived to be actuality and what is perceived might become actuality.²³

Consequently, OSAT developed a series of pilot projects designed to test specific techniques which would define the problems and create changes to enhance greater organizational effectiveness.

The application of the behavioral sciences was eventually keyed to a number of areas based on the previous studies conducted. These areas were: Army personnel management, leadership development and training, organizational design, and human resources research and development.²⁴

Personnel management problems were identified by OSAT as dissent, contempt for legal authority, lack of discipline, racial discord, and drug and alcohol abuse.

These problems demonstrated a lack of commitment, which pervaded the military system.²⁸ The Army's objective was to make the system more responsive and effective in re-establishing professionalism, discipline, job satisfaction, morale, and motivation through OD.

In 1971, it was apparent to Army leaders that the majority of the problems afflicting the Army were not in the area of money and resource management. The primary problems were leadership, management, and command.

Leadership is that part of personnel management, which involves personal influence over others. Leadership occurs when one individual can induce others to do something of their own volition instead of doing something because it is required or because they fear the consequences of noncompliance.

Management is the process of using total available resources to attain specific goals of the organization.

Command is based upon legal authority and responsibility associated with a position.

The difference between the two is that management and leadership are usually treated different.²⁹ Management and leadership become processes through which a commander executes his authority and responsibility to achieve stated outcomes.

The difference in the connotations of the two words has important consequences. Management has "come to be viewed as a rather mechanistic process dealing with concrete factors which are subject to rational and quantifiable analysis."²⁷ From the soldier's perspective, it is often viewed as impersonal and dehumanizing. In contrast, leadership is viewed as the use of interpersonal skills to assist subordinates in doing their jobs with an emphasis on communications.

The reoccurring theme that threads itself through this thesis is that Army senior leadership could not understand the difference between operational research, which is quantifiable, and the unpredictable results of human behavior. Army leaders tended to deal with each problem individually. Johns and Schaum state that personnel management is a combination of "engineering and behavioral strategies that place priority on neither. It assumes that the long-term efficiency of an organization will be maximized when there is a balanced emphasis on people and mission".²⁸

Fundamentally, OD did seek traditional Army goals. What was new was the approach used. OD focuses on interpersonal skills rather than technical knowledge and decision making. It uses methods that are a blend of theory

and practice.²⁹ OD recognizes the need for intellectual understanding of the principles of behavioral science, but does not consider that understanding an end in itself. An important part of the equation is the application of experiential situations where a group can practice behavioral skills and get immediate feedback on their behavior. It is in essence a "hands-on" philosophy in developing the "soft" skills of interpersonal relations.³⁰

The Army was well adapted to teaching the hands-on approach in the areas of technical skills and decision making. For example, Field Training Exercises and Command Post Exercises which evaluate staff and command readiness, can be readily evaluated. The output of this effort is clear and concise operations orders and the ability and flexibility to make decisions in a rapidly changing environment.

The concept of applying OD to the Army was difficult because it is abstract in nature. We talk about trust and confidence, knowing your men, and maintaining an open door policy to facilitate the communicative processes. While we give lip service to on-the-job feedback to leaders, in practice this is rarely done.³¹ Fred Schaum states, "organizational effectiveness is a pretty slippery concept to get across to people, and make them understand in a

positive way how it benefits them personally in their organizations."²² Getting the concept of OD and OE across to leaders in the Army would remain a problem throughout the history of the OE program.

The Motivational Development Program established five pilot projects as discussed in Chapter 2. The Field Organizational Development project at Fort Ord, California evolved into the training center and directorate for OE/OD related activities and functions from 1975 until 1985.

In July, 1972 Fort Ord was directed to initiate a two-year OD pilot project.²³ The purpose was to design a program that would strengthen the chain of command and the quality of Army life by testing and evaluating the following:

a. The use of team-building techniques to improve communication skills and problem solving processes both horizontally and vertically within the chain of command. Team building stressed leadership development through participation in experiential "hands-on" training exercises to obtain the maximum contribution, involvement, and commitment of subordinates.²⁴

b. The most efficient and effective employment of a prototype staff to support OD activities at the installation level.²⁵ The intent was to use a variety of staff agencies

on post to address problems and concerns affiliated with command and support activities.

c. The use of OD analytical procedures and training techniques for community development which examine the broader aspects of military life as well as the soldiers immediate work environment.³⁶ Programs were to be designed to improve customer relations within all service facilities and identify areas needing improvement to assist and to support the users.

d. The best way to apply instruction in OD techniques and procedures and incorporate it into the Officer and NCO educational system.³⁷

The Fort Ord program was divided into four phases.

Phase I. Development, (Jan-June 1973) consisted of team-building procedures and establishing evaluation systems to develop, plan, execute, and evaluate the first OD operations. Also, leadership and professionalism courses for field grade and company grade officers and NCO's were conducted.³⁸

This was to be small unit application below battalion. It turned out that none of the training was ever conducted in the manner called for in the first phase. This was attributed to changed directives from higher headquarters, new commanders, revised organizational

missions, and rapid personnel turnover at every level.³⁹

What did happen was that the Fort Ord Provost Marshall, under the command of LTC Frank Burns, volunteered for a complete organizational assessment of the Military Police. This effort produced mixed results and ended inconclusively because OD techniques were at an experimental stage. It did serve several valuable purposes, however.

The intervention refined organizational survey techniques, mobilized OD efforts into a team effort, and provided an opportunity to use a broad spectrum of techniques and ideas that later were incorporated into Phase II.⁴⁰

Phase II. Testing (July-December 1973) was organized to encompass large unit organizations at the battalion level using the same techniques in Phase I, but applying lessons learned and refining techniques to improve organizational effectiveness.

Phase III. Execution (June-December 1974) was devoted to executing more complex team building activities and programs on post and the evaluation of the results.

Phase IV. Evaluation (January-June 1975) evaluated the entire pilot project test at Fort Ord, including the other four test projects. The information and experience accumulated established became the basis for

developing educational materials for the OE program. This experience provided the basis for training Army personnel at OECS in the use of the behavioral sciences to affect change within the Army.

Pilot Project Results

Evidence gathered from The Motivational Development Program listed five pilot projects which indicated the following:

1. The behavioral sciences are adaptable to the Army.
2. When adapted and implemented as a systemic and integrated process, the behavioral sciences can be instrumental in assisting Army commanders in making substantial improvements in the effectiveness of their organizations.
3. To be effective, this process needs to be applied in a decentralized manner, tailored to suit the local situation and requirements of a participating organization.
4. Implementation of these techniques should support the plans, objectives, and specific needs of the various chains of command.
5. Although responsibility for implementing OD must remain with the commander, specialized staff assistance is required to implement organizational effectiveness.
6. The staff officer providing the assistance must

possess a high degree of technical expertise in the applied behavioral sciences. The officer gains this expertise by intensive skill-oriented training which stresses the practical application of the technology within Army organizations.

7. Initial development of staff expertise should be within the personnel management specialty.⁴¹

The Motivational Development Program ended in June, 1975. By this time the learning experiences from the five pilot projects had been incorporated into operational and educational activities in HQDA, FORSCOM, USAREUR, and TRADOC.⁴²

CLOSING OF OECS

The stated rationale for the closing of the OE program was one of economy.⁴³ The armed services were being restructured, the Vietnam War was over for the United States, inflation was at thirteen percent and rising, and the country would not support a large standing Army.

Choices surrounding budgetary constraints and restraints had to be made by Congress. The decision to end the OE program was one of many made to save dollars. My research indicates that the decision to end the OE program may have been one of false economy.⁴⁴

General (Ret) Bernard W. Rogers as NATO Commander

in 1985, stated to John O. Marsh, Secretary of the Army, and General (Ret) John Wickam, CSA, that the decision to end the OE program was "...tantamount to eating our seed corn." Though Rogers is considered the "Father" of OE, the comment was based on a genuine concern for the Army and its well-being, rather than ownership of the OE program. There are a number of conclusions that may be drawn from this thesis.

First, there was never any real agreement about the purpose or mission of OE in the Army.⁴⁴ This may be interpreted as the inability to align OE efforts with the Army's concept of its purpose. The Vietnam War produced sufficient anti-military sentiment to force the armed services to reexamine their role as a strategic military presence in the world. This reaction directly affected resources for the OE program.

Second, there was a semantic problem which increased the confusion about the purpose of the OE program. The OE program, from 1972 to 1979, had five different titles. These were the Motivational Development Program, OD Directorate, Human Resource Management Training Activity, Organizational Effectiveness Training Center (OETC), and Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS).⁴⁵ Another semantic difference was the name applied to the

practicing consultants. Originally it was Organization Effectiveness Staff Officer (OESO). Then Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer/Noncommissioned Officer (OESO/NCO) to include Non-commissioned officers attending the course. Then Organizational Effectiveness Consultant (OEC), and finally back to OESO.⁴⁶ Officers were primary candidates only because they worked normally at the General Officer level, and it was the perception they had more credibility than NCO's.

Third, there were conflicts internal to the school regarding curriculum development and the type of consultant the course should produce over sixteen weeks. Questions raised were: "Was the graduate a trainer, expert consultant, or process consultant?" "Should the course concentrate on a specific area of OD?" "What instructional mix of OD would best serve the Army?" These issues would never be resolved totally and continued to exist until the program ended.

Fourth, proponents for the OE school were always an issue. The major command supervising the Fort Ord activities was initially the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), from 1975 to 1977. In 1977, supervision shifted to the Army Administration Center (ADMINEN) and back to TRADOC again. From TRADOC, proponenty shifted to Deputy

Chief of Staff Personnel (DCSPER) in 1980 and finally to CSA.

Fifth, OECS failed to turn out senior grade Majors and Captains capable of managing and directing the activities of subordinates. Instead of managing subordinates under their command, they did what they knew best--consult. The results were inadequate records, lack of control, and crisis management.⁴⁷

Sixth, the OE school never successfully produced a method to demonstrate quantifiable results of work completed. Case studies were periodically generated through a cost-benefit analysis of OE operations called "Results Oriented OE. This was an attempt to justify the consultants' time and efforts. This justification of time and effort was based on demands from Department of the Army.⁴⁸

Seventh, personal impropriety evidenced by using Army resources for personal benefit, substance abuse, extramarital affairs, abnormally high divorce rates, and disrespect for military law and custom plagued the OE community. These situations were confronted by senior leadership, but the military system of justice gave little remedy.⁴⁹ This thesis will not investigate the irony of why those selected for the OE school seemed to have such

problems, but it suggests a basis for further research.

Finally, the OE community failed at systematically assessing its own organization. It failed to use its own methodology to correct these internal problems. The effect was that of OE was viewed by many within DA as an undesirable program and subject to fiscal cuts.

Fatally for the the program, senior leadership within the the OE program had not taken sufficient time to confirm its purpose and validate its direction.

This refusal to accept reasonable criticism, and to change ourselves reaped three major results. These were an isolation of the OE community from the Army as a whole, a distortion of our own experience in Army organizations, and a reduction of our ability to explain ourselves to others. These results are clearly related to the 1985 OE program termination decision.^{so}

Thus, a soundly conceived program, based on successful models and real-world corporate experience, came to a premature end before it had served for the Army the purposes for which it was rightly intended.

ENDNOTES

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6. ibid., p. 17
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16. ibid., p. I-8
17. Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking and Systems Practice. (John Wiley and Sons: November 1988) p. 149
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32. Fred W. Schaum, A taped interview. (New Jersey, November, 1989) p. 11
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34. ibid., p. IV-15
35. ibid., p. IV-15
36. ibid., p. IV-16
37. ibid., p. IV-16
38. ibid., p. IV-17

39. Melvin R. Hewitt, Historical Evaluation of Organizational Development and Organizational Effectiveness within the Army, 1969-1980. (Monterey, California: July 1980) p. 8
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44. ibid., p. 8
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51. ibid., p. 15
52. ibid., p. 17

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

This research concludes the concept of "Army management" in the late 1960's and early 1970's was vague and ill-defined. In practice, the concept had come to mean the management of money and material resources. The behavioral sciences were ignored as a way to affect positive changes.¹

OD did appear to offer a valuable means of bringing more scientific technology to the personnel field. The Army did not have appropriately trained personnel to implement OD on a large scale and failed to develop the capability to apply behavioral science technology in developing doctrine and concepts in the area of personnel management. The Motivational Development Program was developed as a way to translate and integrate behavioral science knowledge into doctrine and concepts within the Army.²

There was a weakness in the Army's Personnel Management System that appears to have stemmed from two factors: vague concepts of leadership, command, and management and their relationship to each other, and lack of

expertise in personnel management.

The ambiguity about these concepts is especially important in the area of personnel management where human resource development and leadership are often considered apart from personnel management.³ Likewise, the personnel management field has no established requirements for training officer personnel.⁴

The Army's behavioral science research was weak. The Army depended too much on outside resources; focused too little on social processes (e.g., leadership, training, human relations); and the findings often did not get translated into doctrine and policy.⁵

The Army was not prepared to implement OD to any large degree, much less accept the concept. Research in social processes depended on civilian contractors who may or may not have had much knowledge about the military.⁶

For example, the term "Touchy Feely" referring to OD/OE, was based on the early development of techniques and experiential use of OD. Many military organizations were subjected to uncomfortable experiments which were unrefined OD experiments. At the time, OD practitioners believed they were doing the right thing. The unfortunate results of these interventions created a negative opinion of OD. Many of those exposed to these early experiments would carry a

negative opinion of OD/OE throughout their careers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army should reconsider reinstituting research surrounding OD concepts to determine and measure the results of the behavioral sciences when applied to the Joint Services. This may be a separate research institute devoted to determining the most effective methods to increase over all organizational effectiveness within the services.

The primary reason for a Joint Service effort is that the idea of organizational effectiveness is best understood as a continuous process instead of an end state. Given the ever-changing composition of the goals that are pursued by the Joint Armed Services, senior leadership has a responsibility to restructure available resources in an effort to use talents at their disposal to their utmost to attain such goals.' This can only be achieved at the top levels of the military using OD technology.

The Joint Services should establish a training program which actively involves Army personnel management and trains participants in the use of OD to enhance organizational effectiveness. By doing so, wasted energy is minimized, and the probability of efficiently using the organization's resources for goal attainment is increased.

The OE Program did provide a temporary solution to the problems affecting the Army in the 1970's and 1980's. Although, this program would eventually become a victim of budget cuts in the 70's, I believe the OE program did have a great deal of merit in that it forced the Army to reevaluate it's purpose and mission.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This paper is a broad overview of the Army OE program. Specific details of the internal workings of day to day operations are subject to further research for those interested in the Army Organizational Effectiveness Program.

In addition, a more detailed history of the Army OE program may be found in researching the Army OE curriculum development at Fort Ord, civilian contributions, obtaining and examining official correspondence regarding the closure of the OE school, how OD can enhance leadership and management, and implications for the Joint Services if OE is reinstated.

ENDNOTES

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2. ibid., p. 18
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